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Highlights 
• We review evidence for the downstream effects of being mimicked 
• Effects such as liking are fragile and modulated across context and individuals 
• Neural effects have been found in mirroring, reward and self-other regions 
• We outline models involving self-other overlap, contingency or predictive coding 
• Mimicry priming and virtual mimicry may provide useful future paradigms 
 
 
Abstract 
Compared to our understanding of neurocognitive processes involved producing 
mimicry, the downstream consequences of being mimicked are less clear. A wide variety of 
positive consequences of mimicry, such as liking and helping, have been reported in 
behavioural research. However, an in-depth review suggests the link from mimicry to liking 
and other positive outcomes may be fragile. Positive responses to mimicry can break down 
due to individual factors and social situations where mimicry may be unexpected. It remains 
unclear how the complex behavioural effects of mimicry relate to neural systems which 
respond to being mimicked. Mimicry activates regions associated with mirror properties, self-
other processing and reward. In this review, we outline three potential models linking these 
regions with cognitive consequences of being mimicked. The models suggest that positive 
downstream consequences of mimicry may depend upon self-other overlap, detection of 
contingency or low prediction error. Finally, we highlight limitations with traditional research 
designs and suggest alternative methods for achieving highly ecological validity and 
experimental control. We also highlight unanswered questions which may guide future 
research. 
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It is often said that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, and copying what other 
people do is a central feature of human social interaction (Frith & Frith, 2012; Hamilton, 
2014; Meltzoff, 2010; Over & Carpenter, 2013). One way we copy others is through 
unconscious behavioural mimicry, also described as ‘behaviour matching’ (Bernieri & 
Rosenthal, 1991; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) or the ‘chameleon effect’ (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999). This kind of mimicry occurs when one person unintentionally and effortlessly copies 
another person’s posture or body movements without either one being aware (Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). Mimicry may extend to the contagion of facial 
expressions (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1986, 1987; Dimberg, Thunberg, & 
Elmehed, 2000; Hsee, Hatfield, Carlson, & Chemtob, 1990), moods (Hsee et al., 1990; 
Neumann & Strack, 2000) and speech (Giles & Powesland, 1975; Neumann & Strack, 2000).  
As well as mimicry, there are many other ways we coordinate our behaviour with 
other people during social interactions (Table 1).  The umbrella term ‘interpersonal 
coordination’ covers a range of coordinated actions between two people, which can be linked 
in both space and time. Actions occurring at the same time are described as entrained or 
synchronous; this includes perfect synchrony where actions are matched in form and timing, 
as well as general synchrony where different actions are coordinated in time (see Table 1, 
column 1). Actions that occur after a delay but which are contingent on the other are termed 
imitation or mimicry if the form is the same, and complementary if the form is different (see 
column 2). There is a distinction between imitation, which is deliberate and goal-directed,and 
mimicry, which is unconscious and spontaneous. In this paper we will focus specifically on 
mimicry. For the main part we will limit our review to mimicry of postures and body 
movements, and we will not include literature on facial, emotional or vocal mimicry. We will 
also concentrate on adult mimicry rather than developmental literature. At the end, we will 
return to consider how future research may situate mimicry within a wider framework of 
interpersonal coordination. 
Table 1 about here. 
Whilst partners in real life social interactions may mimic one another reciprocally, in 
research we typically label one person as the mimicker and one person as the mimickee. With 
the spotlight predominantly on the mimicker, recent research has built up a large body of 
evidence about the social and cognitive processes involved in mimicking another person. 
Data from many sources shows that people tend to spontaneously copy each other (Heyes, 
2011). Production of mimicry is modulated by a number of social cues, including motivation 
to affiliate (Chartrand, Maddux, & Lakin, 2005; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003), 
in-group membership (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Yabar, Johnston, Miles, & Peace, 2006), eye 
contact (Wang, Newport, & Hamilton, 2011) and attractiveness (Karremans & Verwijmeren, 
2008; Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2008; van Leeuwen, Veling, van 
Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2009). Priming can modulate the level of mimicry in an interaction, 
with more mimicry following affiliation, fairness or prosocial primes (Cook & Bird, 2011; 
Hofman, Bos, Schutter, & Honk, 2012; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). However, these effects are 
reliably altered by the self-relatedness of the primes (Wang & Hamilton, 2013). Neurally, we 
know that mimicking another person’s action engages inferior parietal cortex and premotor 
cortex (Grèzes & Decety, 2001; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & 
Mattingley, 2009), commonly referred to as the mirror neuron system. These areas are subject 
to top-down control from prefrontal cortex (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Spengler, Brass, 
Kühn, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2010; Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2010; Wang & Hamilton, 
2012). The relationship between mirror systems and top-down control has been described in 
terms of the STORM model (Wang & Hamilton, 2012), and several other detailed models of 
mimicry and imitation have also been developed (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Cross, 
Torrisi, Reynolds Losin, & Iacoboni, 2013; Stephanie Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009)  
From a theoretical point of view, mimicry has been described as a ‘social glue’ (Dijksterhuis, 
2005; Lakin et al., 2003), helping us to bond with members of our social groups by creating 
smooth, harmonious social interactions (Lakin et al., 2003).  
In contrast to this detailed evidence about the production of mimicry, we know less 
about how mimickees perceive and respond to being mimicked. It is widely believed that 
there is a bidirectional link between mimicry and affiliation, such that being mimicked should 
lead to more liking (Chartrand et al., 2005; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003). However, the cognitive processes underlying this link are not yet clear. 
Therefore in the current paper we aim to critically review the literature on mimickees’ social 
and cognitive reactions to being mimicked and outline possible theoretical models that could 
direct future research. In the first section of this review we re-examine whether being 
mimicked leads to positive responses (e.g. liking and trust) and discuss different modulators 
of the positive effects of mimicry. In the second section, we will consider neuroimaging 
studies in which participants were mimicked, imitated or acted in synchrony, in order to 
inform possible neurocognitive models which can account for the behavioural data reviewed 
in the first section. Our aim here is to present speculative accounts which develop different 
theoretical ideas in the literature, so as to stimulate future discussion and research into the 
neurocognitive mechanisms of mimicry interactions. In the third section, we consider 
methodological challenges in studies which have been conducted so far, and suggest future 
directions which may overcome these challenges. Finally, we turn to unanswered questions 
and a broader scope for mimicry research. 
 
 
 
1. How do people respond to being mimicked? 
1.1 Positive Responses to Mimicry  
1.1.1 Affiliation & trust. There is a strong consensus that people respond positively 
to being mimicked. Initially, researchers observed that mimicry during clinical therapy 
sessions (Cappella & Planalp, 1981; Scheflen, 1964, 1972) and classroom interactions 
(Bernieri, 1988; Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991; LaFrance, 1979; LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976) 
was correlated with reported affiliation, empathy and rapport. Several early experiments 
manipulated posture congruency and found that confederates who mirrored the posture of 
participants were evaluated as more similar (Dabbs Jr., 1969; Navarre, 1982), empathic 
(Maurer & Tindall, 1983)and sociable (Navarre, 1982). Then, in a seminal study, Chartrand 
& Bargh (1999, Experiment 2) trained confederates to manipulate the level of mimicry in an 
interaction. Each participant spent fifteen minutes with a confederate, taking turns to describe 
various photographs. In the mimicry condition, the confederate mirrored participants’ 
posture, gestures and mannerisms; in the control condition, the confederate maintained a 
neutral posture. At the end of the session, participants who were mimicked rated the 
confederate as significantly more likeable and the overall interaction as significantly more 
smooth than participants in the control condition. Following this study, the confederate 
paradigm became a popular method for studying mimicry effects (Stel, Rispens, Leliveld, & 
Lokhorst, 2011; Van Baaren & Chartrand, 2005; van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van 
Knippenberg, 2004), and researchers have worked under the assumption that one of the 
fundamental effects of mimicry is to increase liking towards the mimicker (e.g. Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013; Lakin et al., 2003; Stel et al., 2010). 
However, this basic link from mimicry to liking has not been replicated consistently. 
Ten studies which measured liking in response to mimicry are summarised in Table 2. Four 
experiments have replicated Chartrand & Bargh’s (1999) result using the confederate 
paradigm (Kouzakova, Karremans, van Baaren, & van Knippenberg, 2010; Kouzakova, van 
Baaren, & van Knippenberg, 2010; Stel et al., 2011, Study  1). One experiment replicated this 
finding within ‘prosocial’ but not ‘proself’ participants (Stel et al., 2011, Study 2). Two 
experiments using the confederate paradigm failed to replicate the mimicry-liking link, 
despite reporting significant effects of mimicry on other measures (Drury & van Swol, 2005; 
van Swol, 2003). Similar results were reported by a much earlier experiment on posture 
congruency (Dabbs Jr., 1969). Bailenson and Yee (2005) found positive effects using a 
virtual mimicry paradigm: in their experiment, participants wore a head mounted display 
(HMD) which let them see a virtual character in an immersive virtual environment. The 
HMD tracked participants’ head movements and the virtual character either mimicked their 
movement or made head movements recorded from a previous participant, while delivering a 
persuasive speech. Participants who were mimicked rated the character as more effective on a 
composite scale which included likability (Bailenson & Yee, 2005), although the weighting 
of likeability was unclear. Another virtual mimicry study found a positive effect on liking for 
one out of two virtual characters that mimicked participants in the same way (Verberne, Ham, 
Ponnada, & Midden, 2013). Finally, Maddux, Mullen and Galinsky (2008, Study 2) 
instructed participants to either mimic or not mimic their partner during a business 
negotiation task, and found that mimicry did not lead the partners to rate more liking for each 
other. Overall, only 5 of 10 studies found a direct mimicry-liking link, and our list does not 
include studies which have not been published due to negative results. Even the studies which 
have found positive results report small effect sizes (eta squared close to 0.1)  
Table 2 about here. 
The effects of mimicry on trust towards the mimicker appear to be similarly 
inconsistent. In the same business negotiation task, Maddux et al. (2008, Study 2) found that 
the amount of time participants self-reported mimicking their partner was significantly 
correlated with the partner’s rating of trust towards the mimicker, and the partner’s trust 
mediated a positive effect of mimicry on the likelihood of negotiating a successful deal. In 
line with these findings, Verberne et al. (2013) found people rated more trust towards a 
virtual character that mimicked them, and mimicry also increased participants’ willingness to 
trust the virtual character in a decision-making task. However, they could not replicate these 
results with a second character and a different behavioural measure. Thus, the effects of 
mimicry on implicit trust behaviour may be mimicker- and task-dependent (Hasler, 
Hirschberger, Shani-Sherman, & Friedman, 2014). Similar to the studies measuring liking, 
these results suggest that being mimicked may not reliably increase trust in the mimicker 
across all contexts. 
1.1.2 Prosocial and self-related changes. A reliable positive consequence of 
mimicry is an increase in prosocial behaviour. Following mimicry, participants are not only 
more likely to agree with an explicit request for help (Guéguen, Martin, & Meineri, 2011), 
they are also more spontaneously helpful: van Baaren et al. (2004, experiment 1) found that 
people who were mimicked by an experimenter while taking turns to describe advertisements 
were more likely to pick up some pens she dropped after the end of the task. In a follow-up 
experiment, people who were mimicked were also more likely to help an unrelated 
experimenter (van Baaren et al., 2004). Similar responses were recently demonstrated in 
infants aged 18 months using an adaptation of the same paradigm (Carpenter, Uebel, & 
Tomasello, 2013). In other contexts, being mimicked made participants more willing to help 
an unknown researcher by filling out a tedious questionnaire (Ashton-James, van Baaren, 
Chartrand, Decety, & Karremans, 2007) and made people passing along a street more 
compliant with a stranger’s request for help (Fischer-Lokou, Martin, Guéguen, & Lamy, 
2011). As well as helping, mimicry leads people to donate more money to charity, regardless 
of whether the charity is connected to the mimicker (van Baaren et al., 2004). People may 
even be more inclined to vote for prosocial left-wing political parties following mimicry (Stel 
& Harinck, 2011). Taken together, these findings suggest that mimicry elicits prosocial 
responses which extend beyond the mimicry interaction (Van Baaren & Chartrand, 2005; van 
Baaren et al., 2004).  
Mimicry also appears to influence or affect the self-construal of the person being 
mimicked. When completing a ‘twenty statements’ measure of self-construal (Kuhn & 
McPartland, 1954), in which people may define themselves by relationships with other 
people (interdependently) or without reference to others (independently), people reliably 
provide more interdependent statements following mimicry (Redeker, Stel, & Mastop, 2011; 
Stel & Harinck, 2011; Stel et al., 2011). Participants who were mimicked also felt closer to 
others when completing an ‘inclusion of other in the self’ (IOS) scale (Aron, Aron, & 
Smollan, 1992), which depicts increasingly overlapping circles representing self and other 
(Ashton-James et al., 2007, Experiment 2). As well as feeling closer to others, participants 
who have been mimicked are more likely to connect objects with their surrounding context 
and see similarities between photographs which are not systematically related (van Baaren, 
Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009). They also show less divergent thinking and more 
convergent thinking, which can facilitate collaboration (Ashton-James & Chartrand, 2009). 
Together, these studies suggest that being mimicked leads to both an interdependent self-
construal and prosocial behaviour. Notably, these effects have been demonstrated together 
(Ashton-James et al., 2007; Catmur & Heyes, 2013; Stel & Harinck, 2011) and Ashton-James 
et al. (2007, Study 4) found that self-construal mediated the effect of mimicry on prosocial 
behaviour. We will return to this causal link in the next section.  
1.1.3 Changing opinions. Being mimicked can change people’s opinions and 
behaviour in a number of ways. Mimicry increases perceived smoothness in an 
interaction(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). For example, people were more likely to disclose 
intimate information (Guéguen, Martin, Meineri, & Simon, 2013) or give honest answers 
(Guéguen, 2013) to a confederate who mimicked them. Mimickers are also rated as being 
more persuasive than non-mimickers (Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Drury & van Swol, 2005; van 
Swol, 2003), and may sometimes be more successful in swaying people to agree with their 
opinion (Bailenson & Yee, 2005, but see van Swol, 2003) or to consume and purchase goods 
(Herrmann, Rossberg, Huber, Landwehr, & Henkel, 2011; Jacob, Guéguen, Martin, & 
Boulbry, 2011; Tanner, Ferraro, Chartrand, Bettman, & Baaren, 2008). Furthermore, mimicry 
can improve negotiation outcomes (Maddux et al., 2008): participants who negotiated for 
around 30 minutes had better personal and joint outcomes when one member of the dyad was 
instructed to mimic (Maddux et al., 2008). These outcomes suggest that mimicry could 
indeed be a beneficial social strategy for inducing compliance (Lakin et al., 2003). However, 
increasing conformity of opinions is not always positive. Mimicry can make participants 
conform to stereotypes consistent with group stereotypes even when those are negative 
towards the participant and the participant does not endorse them (Leander, Chartrand, & 
Wood, 2011). Together, these studies suggest that being mimicked may make participants 
more conformist or likely to agree, with both the good and bad consequences that can bring. 
1.2 Factors Modulating Positive Responses to Mimicry 
1.2.1 Mimicker factors. A large number of factors can alter the general picture that 
mimicry has positive and prosocial effects. This is particularly clear in situations where 
people interact with a member of their social outgroup. People typically produce less mimicry 
towards others who they initially dislike (Stel et al., 2010), outgroup members (Bourgeois & 
Hess, 2008; Yabar, Johnston, Miles, & Peace, 2006), and others from a different race 
(Johnston, 2002). Being mimicked by someone from an outgroup does not seem to have the 
same prosocial consequences as ingroup mimicry. For example, following mimicry from an 
ingroup (White) or outgroup (Black) confederates, Dalton et al. (2010, Experiment 2) gave 
participants a Stroop task as a measure of cognitive resource depletion. The results showed a 
significant interaction between mimicry and race: participants who were mimicked by a 
confederate of the same race showed less resource depletion than people who were not 
mimicked; on the other hand, participants who were mimicked by someone of a different race 
showed more resource depletion than people who were not mimicked (Dalton et al., 2010). 
Mimicry by an outgroup member also leads participants to report a room as colder than 
mimicry from an ingroup member (Leander, Chartrand, & Bargh, 2012, Experiment 3).   
Similar effects are found when social status and affiliation is manipulated. Dalton et 
al. (2010) manipulated status by assigning participants to the role of leader or follower and a 
confederate to the other role. Participants who were mimicked by a leader showed more 
resource depletion in a later Stroop task, compared to those mimicked by a follower (Dalton 
et al., 2010, Experiment 3). Participants who were mimicked by a confederate expressing 
affiliation showed positive consequences of mimicry, whereas those mimicked by a task-
focused confederate did not (Leander et al. 2012, Experiment 1). A plausible explanation for 
all these effects is that mimicry only has positive consequences in contexts where it is 
expected. If being mimicked is unexpected, because a partner is an outgroup member or of 
higher status or not interested in affiliating, then participants do not respond in the same way 
to being mimicked. 
1.2.2 Mimickee factors. The consequences of mimicry may also depend critically on 
the personality or other features of the participant being mimicked. In particular, people who 
are highly ‘proself’ rather than ‘prosocial’ may not respond positively to being mimicked. 
Stel et al. (2011) defined participants as prosocial if they consistently chose to benefit another 
player in a game, and proself if they played the game competitively or for individual gain. 
The prosocial participants reacted positively to being mimicked and indicated more liking 
towards a mimicker than a non-mimicker; however, this effect was absent in proself 
participants (Stel et al., 2011). Similarly, although mimicry usually causes people to feel 
more interdependent, people who naturally have a strong independent self-construal could 
find it uncomfortable to be mimicked. Highly independent people underestimated the room 
temperature as a result of mimicry; in contrast, highly interdependent people underestimated 
temperature when they were not mimicked (Leander et al., 2012, Experiment 2). Individual 
differences in self-construal can reflect differences in cultural background (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), which may modulate responses to mimicry in a similar way. Sanchez-
Burks et al. (2009) showed that US Latino participants, whose culture emphasises social 
harmony, felt anxious when interviewed by a confederate that did not mimic them, whereas 
this was not observed in US Anglos. Overall, a variety of findings indicate that people who 
highly value personal gain or feel independent from others may not show the expected 
positive reactions to being mimicked.  
Social anxiety may also prevent some individuals from responding positively to 
mimicry. People with high social anxiety tend to focus on themselves and feel awkward 
during conversations (Heerey & Kring, 2007). Therefore it is not surprising that women with 
high social anxiety mimic others less than non-socially anxious women (Vrijsen, Lange, 
Becker, & Rinck, 2010). However, Vrijsen Lange, Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Rinck (2010) also 
found that women with high social anxiety do not respond positively when they are mimicked 
by someone else. In their study, women listened to two virtual characters give an opinionated 
speech; one mimicked participants’ head movements and the other did not mimic. Socially 
anxious women evaluated both character as similarly likable, friendly and convincing, 
whereas non-socially anxious women evaluated the mimicking character more highly 
(Vrijsen, Lange, Dotsch, et al., 2010). This suggests that being mimicked may not have 
prosocial effects in individuals who focus on themselves due to high social anxiety. 
Finally, the prosocial effects of mimicry are expected to break down when people 
become aware they are being mimicked (Ashton-James et al., 2007; Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Dalton et al., 2010; Guéguen et al., 2013). However, very few studies have directly 
addressed this expectation, as it is common practice to exclude participants who detected 
mimicry manipulations from analyses (e.g. Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Cheng & Chartrand, 
2003; Drury & van Swol, 2005; van Swol, 2003). Bailenson et al. (2008, Experiment 2) 
explicitly tested how people respond when they detect they are being mimicked. A virtual 
character mimicked participants’ head movements while delivering a persuasive speech in an 
immersive virtual environment. Eighty per cent of participants detected they were being 
mimicked; these participants rated the character as significantly less warm and trustworthy 
compared participants who did not detect mimicry (Bailenson et al., 2008), suggesting that 
people may only respond positively to mimicry when they are unaware it is happening. 
1.3 Summary 
As previous reviews have described (Chartrand & Dalton, 2009; Chartrand & Lakin, 
2013; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; van Baaren, Janssen, et al., 2009), there are a variety of 
ways in which people respond positively to mimicry. Mimicry can change people’s 
perception of the mimicker, including judgements of likeability and trust, although these 
effects are not very reliable. Mimicry can change a participant’s self-construal, leading an 
increase in prosocial behaviour, and may also increase agreement and conformist behaviour. 
These effects are modulated by characteristics of both the mimicker and mimickee. If 
characteristics of the mimicker make mimicry seem unlikely, including outgroup membership 
or high status, then participants do not respond positively to mimicry. Participants who are 
naturally independent or socially anxious also report less positive effects of mimicry. In the 
following section, we review neural systems which respond to being mimicked and consider 
possible neurocognitive models which could help us understand these effects. 
 2. Neurocognitive Mechanisms for Responding to Mimicry 
2.1 Neural Correlates of Being Mimicked 
There is little data on the neural correlates of being mimicked, owing to the difficulty 
of studying this spontaneous social interaction under controlled conditions (Guionnet et al., 
2012). Only one study has measured a mimickee’s neural response to mimicry of their 
postures and body movements (Hogeveen, Chartrand, & Obhi, 2014). However, several other 
research groups have measured neural activation in response to closely related experiences, 
including being overtly imitated by a live experimenter or a video stimulus (Brass et al., 
2009; Decety, Chaminade, Grèzes, & Meltzoff, 2002; Guionnet et al., 2012), passively 
observing a mimicry interaction from the perspective of the mimickee (Kühn et al., 2010), 
and interactional synchrony driven by another person (Cacioppo et al., 2014; Kokal, Engel, 
Kirschner, & Keysers, 2011). Here we consider the available data from these different 
paradigms in order to infer possible neural systems involved in responding to mimicry. The 
studies (summarised in Table 3) highlight three systems involved in responding to mimicry: 
(1) a perception-action matching system which recognises when we are being mimicked, (2) 
a self-other system which relates actions made by self and other, and (3) a reward system 
associated with positive affect and prosocial behaviour (Figure 1).  
Figure 1 about here. 
2.1.1 Perception-action matching. There is extensive evidence that the production of 
mimicry relies on the mirror system regions of inferior parietal and inferior frontal cortex 
(Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). These are robustly activated when 
people produce actions, observe actions and imitate actions (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & 
Eickhoff, 2010; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2009). These same regions are also 
likely to have a role in detecting when someone else is mimicking, because they have the 
capacity to match observed to performed actions. One study tested this using EEG recordings 
of the mu-rhythm, a possible marker of MNS function. Hogeveen et al. (2014) took EEG 
recordings before and after participants completed a rating task. The task involved one of 
three conditions: social interaction with a mimicking confederate, social interaction with an 
anti-mimicking confederate, or interaction with a computer. During EEG recording, 
participants observed video actions. Their mu-rhythm suppression, which is thought to reflect 
activation of the sensorimotor cortex, was measured as an indirect index of MNS activity. 
The results showed enhanced mu-suppression from pre- to post-test in the mimicry condition. 
The same increase was not found in the anti-mimicry condition, and the increase was 
significant relative to the computer condition. These findings suggest that being mimicked 
during naturalistic social interaction leads to an increase in MNS activity which can be 
detected during subsequent action observation. 
Two neuroimaging studies provide evidence that being imitated leads to activation in 
the left inferior parietal cortex, a classic region of the MNS (Molenberghs et al., 2009; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Decety et al. (2002) used PET to measure participants’ brain 
activity in response to deliberately imitating or being imitated by an experimenter. The 
experimenter and participant each had a set of three small objects to manipulate with their 
right hand and they could see each other’s hands via live video links. In this paradigm, 
participants knew in advance whether they were about to be imitated or not in each block of 
the experiment. There was an increase in activity in the left inferior parietal cortex when 
participants were imitated by the experimenter as well as when they did the imitating. Similar 
activity was found in recent fMRI study of participants who experienced another person not 
in their view (actually a computer algorithm) synchronising with them on a computer screen 
while the participant simply tapped a button (Cacioppo et al., 2014). Compared to 
experiencing asynchrony, while participants experienced synchrony they showed greater 
activity in the left inferior parietal cortex. Therefore, converging evidence from mimicry, 
imitation and synchrony paradigms suggests the MNS is involved in the unconscious 
recognition of mimicry through perception-action matching.  
2.1.2 Relation between self and other actions. Being mimicked also appears to 
activate several regions associated with self-other processing. Decety et al. (2002) found that 
being imitated was associated with stronger activation in the right inferior parietal cortex, 
compared to imitating someone. This region is thought to have a role in self-other 
discrimination and sensing agency (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Ruby 
& Decety, 2001; Uddin, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2006). Consistent with this 
finding, Brass et al. (2009) found significant activation in the TPJ in response to being 
imitated. In their fMRI study, participants made index or middle finger movements that were 
congruent or incongruent with a stimulus movement, and either saw the stimulus movement 
before or after they responded. Similar levels of TPJ activity were observed when the 
participant was imitated and when they experienced an incongruent stimulus. This pattern of 
results is consistent with the interpretation that TPJ responds when observed movements are 
delayed or dissimilar performed movements, suggesting this region is involved in 
distinguishing between self and other actions or perspectives (Brass et al., 2009; Jean Decety 
& Sommerville, 2003; Ruby & Decety, 2001; S. Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2010). 
However, other results suggest that being mimicked is associated with increased self-
other overlap in frontal regions. Kuhn et al. (2010) set out to investigate the neural correlates 
of positive responses to mimicry. Specifically, participants in an fMRI scanner passively 
observed videos of social interactions where they took the first-person perspective of an actor 
being mimicked or anti-mimicked. Compared to anti-mimicry, mimicry led to increased 
activity in the mOFC/vmPFC, which correlated with ratings of interpersonal closeness. 
Therefore, being mimicked may be associated with processes of self-other overlap in 
mOFC/vmPFC in addition to processes of self-other distinction in TPJ and inferior parietal 
cortex. 
2.1.3 Positive responses to mimicry. Neuroimaging data also highlight a system of 
reward activation in response to being mimicked. In the study described above, Kuhn et al. 
(2010) also demonstrated activation in brain areas associated with emotion and reward 
processing. The mimicry condition was associated with increased functional connectivity 
between vmPFC and the striatum and mid-posterior insula, regions which are related to 
positive affective states and emotional salience (Craig, 2005; Kühn et al., 2010; Uddin, 
2015). In a different paradigm, Guionnet et al. (2012) used live video links to study neural 
activity while being imitated in an fMRI scanner. Participants either moved their hands and 
were imitated by an experimenter, or imitated the experimenter’s hand movements. 
Consistent with the functional connectivity reported by Kuhn et al. (2010), there was greater 
activation in the left anterior insula when participants were imitated. These findings indicate 
that a reward network involving the striatum and insula may be activated in connection to 
vmPFC in response to being mimicked. 
Further evidence for the same reward system comes from an fMRI study of 
synchronous behaviour. Kokal et al. (2011) examined activity in the caudate during a 
drumming task in which participants experienced a partner drumming in synchrony or 
asynchrony with them. They found that that ease of drumming was associated with activation 
in the caudate, a region also active in processing monetary reward. Importantly, caudate 
activation while drumming in synchrony predicted prosocial behaviour towards the 
drumming partner at the end of the experiment. These findings provide evidence for a neural 
link from synchrony-related reward processing to downstream prosocial behaviour, which 
has previously been found to follow synchronised behaviour and mimicry (P. Valdesolo & 
DeSteno, 2011; van Baaren et al., 2004; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). 
2.2 Neurocognitive Models of Being Mimicked 
From these initial neuroimaging results, it seems that being mimicked may activate 
three neural systems, one which detects mimicry (MNS), one which relates self and other 
actions (TPJ and vmPFC), and one which reflects the positive consequences of mimicry 
(striatum and insula). However, there are very few data points here which makes it hard to 
develop a cognitive model of how these systems might operate together when someone is 
being mimicked. To advance the field, we can also draw on our extensive knowledge of brain 
systems engaged in relevant cognitive processes, in particular perception-action matching, 
social reward processing and perspective-taking. Numerous studies have shown that imitating 
other people’s actions and observing action engages the MNS (Caspers et al., 2010; 
Molenberghs et al., 2009, 2009). There is also a large body of literature showing that socially 
rewarding activities engage the insula, ventral striatum and OFC (e.g. Aharon et al., 2001; 
Bhanji & Delgado, 2014; Fliessbach et al., 2007; Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2008; O’Doherty et 
al., 2003; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). In addition, several lines of 
evidence suggest that perspective-taking and other forms of self-other processing engage 
mPFC and TPJ (Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005; David et al., 2006; Denny, Kober, 
Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Heatherton et al., 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2001). Drawing on this 
knowledge in conjunction with the specific studies of being mimicked (reviewed above), we 
can then begin to propose cognitive models which link together these systems and suggest 
how they may relate to the behavioural effects of being mimicked. Here we will outline three 
possible models which draw from existing theoretical ideas in the literature and develop them 
in relation to the neuroscientific evidence reviewed above. We note that all three models are 
highly speculative, and hope that they will inspire future work to test and distinguish between 
them. We will also consider how well each model can account for the current data on 
behavioural responses to being mimicked.  
2.2.1 Self-Other Overlap model. One possible model linking neural and behavioural 
responses to being mimicked could depend upon self-other processing. During mimicry, the 
boundary between self and other is thought to become blurred (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 
1998), and Ashton-James et al. (2007) have proposed that an increase in self-other overlap 
mediates the prosocial consequences of being mimicked. The Self-Other Overlap model 
builds on this cognitive pathway by speculating that when perception-action matching occurs 
in the MNS, regions involved in self-other processing are activated. In turn, frontal regions 
associated with interpersonal closeness may activate a reward system involving the insula and 
caudate, which may lead to an increase in prosocial behaviour (Kokal et al., 2011). Other 
positive responses to mimicry may also result from this cognitive pathway, although only 
prosocial behaviour has been previously tested (Ashton-James et al., 2007) 
Importantly, the Self-Other Overlap model assumes that being mimicked leads to a 
general tendency to see oneself as closer to others (Ashton-James et al., 2007), despite neural 
activation in TPJ and inferior parietal cortex associated with self-other distinction (Brass et 
al., 2009; J. Decety et al., 2002). Several lines of research suggest that the ability to 
distinguish self- and other-perspectives is essential for taking another’s perspective 
(Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007), which may be an important 
process in empathy (Bird & Viding, 2014; Jean Decety & Jackson, 2006) and prosocial 
cooperation (Galinsky et al., 2005; Maddux et al., 2008). Therefore, this model assumes that 
mimicry ultimately leads people to see others as more ‘like me’ (Meltzoff, 2007a, 2007b) and 
behave more prosocially as a result of this self-other overlap. 
The Self-Other Overlap model can account for many of the positive responses to 
mimicry reviewed earlier. In particular, several research groups demonstrated that being 
mimicked makes people behave prosocially towards others in general, and not just the person 
mimicking (Ashton-James et al., 2007; Carpenter et al., 2013; J. Fischer-Lokou et al., 2011; 
Stel & Harinck, 2011; van Baaren et al., 2004). In fact, no studies have reported social effects 
of being mimicked which failed to extend to other people beyond the mimicker. Furthermore, 
being mimicked induces cognitive changes in feelings of interdependence (Redeker et al., 
2011; Stel & Harinck, 2011; Stel et al., 2011), social distance (Ashton-James et al., 2007) and 
convergent thinking (Ashton-James & Chartrand, 2009). These findings are consistent with 
the suggestion that being mimicked primarily increases self-other overlap, and other 
consequences are secondary. If people tend to rate mimickers as more likeable, trustworthy or 
persuasive due to a general prosocial effect rather than a change in their perceptions of the 
mimicker, this could also explain why mimicry appears to have less robust effects on these 
ratings compared to prosocial behaviour.  
However, Hogeveen et al. (2014) found mimicry did not lead to increased self-other 
overlap using the IOS scale, which is inconsistent with the model’s predictions. The Overlap 
model also does not explain why the positive effects of mimicry are modulated by 
characteristics of the mimicker. If being mimicked primarily increases self-other overlap, it is 
unclear why participants do not respond positively to mimicry from an outgroup member 
(Dalton et al., 2010; Leander et al., 2012), higher status person (Dalton et al., 2010) or task-
focused individual (Leander et al., 2012). Arguably, increased self-other overlap should have 
especially notable effects in these interactions, because the initial level of overlap may be 
lowered.  
2.2.2 Contingency model. Whereas the first model proposed that perception-action 
matching is linked to reward via self-other processing, the Contingency model assumes that 
detecting contingency between our own actions and the world is intrinsically rewarding and 
motivating.  Under this model, complementary and imitative actions would all be processed 
in the same way and be equally rewarding.  From infancy, the ability to detect contingent 
caregiver behaviour is found to increase positive affect, self-efficacy and social motivation 
towards the caregiver (Dunham, Dunham, Hurshman, & Alexander, 1989; Millar, 1988; 
Watson & Ramey, 1972). The Contingency model therefore proposes that being mimicked 
leads to positive responses due to the contingency of the mimicker’s actions on the 
mimickee’s. This view is supported by a recent study showing that people responded 
positively to contingent movements regardless of how similar the movements were to their 
own (Catmur & Heyes, 2013), suggesting that positive responses to mimicry may be 
attributed to contingency and not behaviour-matching. The MNS may be responsible for 
detecting this contingency. Several studies provide evidence that mirror associations in the 
MNS are learned through contingent experience, by demonstrating the MNS can form similar 
associations between dissimilar actions through repeated contingent experiences (Catmur et 
al., 2008; Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007; Heyes, 2001). Therefore, when the MNS is active 
in responding to mimicry it may actually reflect the detection of contingency.  
The contingency model would predict that positive affective and social consequences 
of detecting contingency can be attributed to activation of the neural reward system. 
However, this system may be tuned to an expected level of contingency. Infant studies show 
that contingent behaviour from a stranger only elicits positive responses when the degree of 
contingency is similar to their caregiver’s behaviour (Bigelow, 1998, 2001). Research in 
robotics also highlights the importance of ‘appropriate’ contingency levels in creating 
realistic social entities (Yamaoka, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2006, 2007). Therefore, the 
Contingency model would also predict that reward is not a fixed response to being mimicked.  
In support of the Contingency model, being in synchrony has similar positive effects 
to being mimicked. In particular, synchronised movement leads to increased liking (Hove & 
Risen, 2009; Lynden K. Miles, Nind, & Macrae, 2009) and prosocial behaviour (Reddish, 
Fischer, & Bulbulia, 2013; Piercarlo Valdesolo, Ouyang, & DeSteno, 2010; Wiltermuth & 
Heath, 2009). Synchrony and mimicry also appear to activate similar reward regions in the 
brain (Cacioppo et al., 2014; Kokal et al., 2011). Since synchronised movements are 
characterised by temporal contingency rather than similarity (Catmur & Heyes, 2013), this 
suggests that contingency may explain these effects of mimicry. Decreasing the time lag in 
mimicking is also thought to elicit stronger responses and make mimicry easier to detect 
(Bailenson, Beall, Loomis, Blascovich, & Turk, 2004). The Contingency model is also 
consistent with the breakdown of positive responses to mimicry in contexts and individuals 
where a lower level of mimicry is typical (Dalton et al., 2010; Leander et al., 2012).  
However, whether mere contingency is ‘enough’ or whether the similarity of actions 
has additional importance is a matter of debate. The Contingency model we have outlined is 
directly challenged by studies comparing merely contingent behaviour to mimicry: in both 
infants (Agnetta & Rochat 2004) and adults (Hogeveen et al., 2014; Kulesza, Szypowska, 
Jarman, & Dolinski, 2014), mimicry elicits more positive responses than contingent 
behaviour or anti-mimicry. People also show a preference for movements that involve the 
same effector even when there is no temporal contingency (Sparenberg, Topolinski, Springer, 
& Prinz, 2012), which suggests that similarity of movement may still account for some of the 
positive effects of being mimicked. 
2.2.3 Similarity model. Like the Contingency model, the Similarity model proposes a 
direct pathway from perception-action matching to reward activation, and makes the claim 
that the most predictable response from the other person is the one with the highest reward 
value.  In this context, the similarity model assumes that an imitative action is more 
rewarding than a non-imitative one because the kinematic similarity of imitation makes it 
easier to predict the imitative pattern of action.  This means that imitative actions would be 
more rewarding than complementary actions.  Note that overlearning complementary actions 
(e.g. the grasp patterns involved in handing a mug to another person) might also be highly 
predictable and thus rewarding. 
  There is increasing evidence that the brain is good at prediction in both perception 
and action (Brown & Brüne, 2012; Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; Clark, 2013). In 
line with this evidence, the Similarity model assumes the brain is a predictive system which 
aims to anticipate future sensory inputs (Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011; Kilner, Friston, & 
Frith, 2007), and which finds predictable inputs rewarding. Within this framework, the MNS 
is part of a generative model that tries to predict incoming sensory input (Kilner, 2011). 
Using knowledge of a participant’s own action and of the social context, the MNS can 
generate predictions about what the other person will do and can compare those to the other’s 
actual action. If the other person mimics the participant, the visual input is predictable 
because it is similar to the participant’s own action, leading to a low prediction error signal. 
However, if the other person does not mimic but instead performs some other contingent 
action, the visual input is less predictable and the error signal is higher. This means that 
interacting with someone who mimics leads to less prediction error and more activation of 
reward-related brain networks, which could induce a positive or prosocial mood.  
Like the Contingency model, the Similarity model could also generalise to take into 
account contextual expectations of mimicry. It has previously been suggested that not being 
imitated is generally unexpected, and therefore experienced negatively (van Baaren, Decety, 
Dijksterhuis, van der Leij, & van Leeuwen, 2009). If a participant is in a context where 
mimicry is likely (e.g. interacting with an in-group member), then their MNS will generate a 
mimicry prediction and when this matches their visual input, prediction error is low and 
reward is high. However, if a participant is in a context where mimicry is not likely (e.g. 
interacting with an outgroup member), then their MNS will predict other actions which are 
not similar to their own. If the interaction partner does mimic, the visual input concerning 
their actions will not match the predicted visual input, leading to a high prediction error and 
low reward. Note that this generalisation would require additional contextual information to 
modulate what the MNS predicts.  
By taking mimicry context into account, the Similarity model is able to explain both 
positive consequences of being mimicked and the breakdown of these positive consequences 
in certain contexts. Many of the positive effects of mimicry, such as affiliation (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999; Stel & Vonk, 2010), persuasion (Drury & van Swol, 2005; van Swol, 2003) and 
perceived smoothness (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) could be direct consequences of reward 
activation during social interaction. The suggestion that these positive responses depend on 
the expectation of being mimicked is also consistent with studies showing that mimicry from 
an outgroup member, high status person or disaffiliative person challenges our expectations, 
leading to cognitive resource depletion (Dalton et al., 2010) and negative responses (Leander 
et al., 2012). The Similarity model is also consistent with data suggesting that individual 
differences in self-construal mediate whether people respond positively to being mimicked. 
Considering that self-construal is closely tied to cultural norms (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Sanchez-Burks et al., 2009), people with strongly independent self-construals may expect to 
be mimicked less often than people who feel strongly interdependent (Sanchez-Burks et al., 
2009; Stel et al., 2011). Thus, people with independent self-construals may not respond 
positively to mimicry because they do not predict mimicry will occur. 
However, this model is less clear in explaining the robust link between mimicry and 
prosocial behaviour. It is unclear why a low prediction error and subsequent reward 
activation should lead to prosocial responses such as helping other people, and why prosocial 
behaviour should extend beyond the person mimicking (Van Baaren & Chartrand, 2005; van 
Baaren et al., 2004). Others have suggested that positive affect may be associated with 
creative and prosocial cognitive styles (Ashton-James & Chartrand, 2009), but there is no 
clear evidence for a pathway from reward activation to positive affect to generalised 
prosocial behaviour. Given that increased prosocial behaviour appears to be one of the most 
consistent effects of being mimicked, this is a significant limitation of the Similarity model. 
2.3 Summary 
The available neuroimaging and EEG data from mimicry, imitation and synchrony 
tasks suggested that being mimicked may activate mirror neuron systems, brain regions for 
self-other processing and reward-related systems. We have outlined three speculative models 
which link these neural systems to possible cognitive processes that follow being mimicked. 
The Self-Other Overlap model suggests that recognising a perception-action match in the 
MNS may lead to neural reward via self-other processing; in contrast, the Contingency model 
and Similarity models propose a direct link between perception-action matching and reward 
activation (Figure 1). The Contingency model argues that this link depends purely on the 
temporal contingency of the mimicker’s actions on the mimickee’s and that the kinematic 
form of their actions is not relevant. In contrast, the Similarity model suggests that kinematic 
similarity between mimicker and mimickee movements increases the predictability of the 
mimicker’s behaviour, which reduces prediction error and increases reward.  
Each model is able to predict some of the reported outcomes of being mimicked. 
However, none of them fully explain the range of findings reviewed in the first section. This 
suggests the effects of being mimicked could be explained by a combination of the models 
above or other models we have not outlined here. We hope that the models above will 
provide starting points for theoretically-driven discussion and research into the processes 
underlying people’s responses to mimicry. To develop more accurate models, it will be 
important to perform studies which carefully control levels of contingency and predictability, 
and which find better ways to measure the consequences of being mimicked. 
In the next section we will review some of the methodological challenges limiting 
traditional paradigms for studying mimicry effects and highlight future directions which may 
overcome these challenges. We will also discuss aspects of mimicry which have so far 
received little attention and may be relevant to future theorising about the consequences of 
being mimicked. 
 
 
3. Methodological Challenges and Future Directions 
3.1 Challenges 
3.1.1 Manipulating mimicry. The first major challenge in testing the consequences 
of being mimicked is to achieve a well-controlled manipulation of mimicry. Since mimicry 
normally occurs unconsciously (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand, Maddux, & Lakin, 
2005), it is inherently difficult to generate or eliminate. A compromise is to instruct 
participants or confederates to mimic in one experimental condition and refrain from 
mimicking in a control condition. Although this kind of instructed mimicry can reach similar 
levels to spontaneous mimicry (Stel, Dijk, & Olivier, 2009; Stel, van den Heuvel, & Smeets, 
2008), this is not guaranteed. If untrained participants are instructed to mimic it is necessary 
to perform manipulation checks, such as asking the participant to report how well they 
followed the instruction (Maddux et al., 2008) or video recording their behaviour (Stel & 
Vonk, 2010). Even with trained confederates, it may be hard to achieve consistent 
performance (Fox et al. 2009). 
It may also be hard to control extraneous variables. The instruction to mimic imposes 
cognitive demands which could change other aspects of the social interaction, such as 
emotional understanding (Stel et al., 2009). Furthermore, it is impossible for a confederate to 
be blind to experimental condition, and hard for them to be blind to the research hypothesis. 
It is also possible differences in non-mimicry behaviour from confederates between 
conditions could influence the experimental results, without confederate or experimenter 
being aware of this. For example, postural mimicry is normally intertwined with emotional 
and vocal imitation (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand et al., 2005), and other types of co-
ordination like synchrony (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991), turn-taking (Pentland, 2010; 
Wallbott, 1995) and eye contact (Wang, Newport, & Hamilton, 2011). Sometimes these 
behaviours are deliberately included in the mimicry manipulation (e.g. synchrony, Chartrand 
& Bargh, 1999; facial and vocal imitation, Stel et al., 2011), but researchers wishing to 
control for these variables must usually video their experiment and code the behaviour post 
hoc (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Drury & van Swol, 2005; Sanchez-Burks et al., 2009; 
van Swol, 2003). 
There are also challenges associated with achieving a good control condition. In some 
paradigms, the control condition is defined as non-mimicry, i.e. neutral movements (e.g. 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Kouzakova, Karremans, et al., 2010; van Baaren et al., 2004). In 
other paradigms, the control condition involves anti-mimicry, i.e. deliberately dissimilar 
movements (e.g. Ashton-James et al., 2007; Hasler, Hirschberger, Shani-Sherman, & 
Friedman, 2014). These conditions may have significantly different effects; for example, 
people bought significantly more products when they were not mimicked compared to anti-
mimicked (Kulesza et al., 2014). Therefore, researchers need to consider the appropriate 
control condition to use.   
3.1.2 Measuring mimicry effects. The second major challenge is to find valid ways 
of measuring how being mimicked affects a participant. Ratings of the mimicry interaction 
are easy to administer and widely used (e.g. Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Stel et al., 2011; Stel & Vonk, 2010; Vrijsen, Lange, Dotsch, et al., 2010). However, 
there are no standardised rating scales for many of the constructs of interest in mimicry 
research, such as liking and rapport (see Table 2). Besides subjective ratings, it is also useful 
to measure behavioural responses. A wide variety of behavioural measures have been used, 
including Stroop task reaction times (Dalton et al., 2010), estimates of room temperature 
(Leander et al., 2012), the number of pens picked up (van Baaren et al., 2004), and seat 
choice (Ashton-James et al., 2007). These measures have the advantage of measuring 
participants’ implicit reactions to being mimicked but are not very closely related to the 
mimicry itself and could be influenced by other factors. Better measures of the consequences 
of mimicry, both behavioural and neural measures, will be very valuable. 
3.1.3 Moderators of mimicry effects. An additional challenge is to test how mimicry 
effects are modulated by social contexts and characteristics of the mimicker. This challenge 
particularly applies to confederate paradigms which manipulate mimicry within a live 
interaction (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stel et al., 2011; van Baaren et al., 2004), because 
it is necessary to (a) find the right confederate and (b) train that person to perform 
appropriately. Confederate features such as race, gender and age may all affect mimicry, but 
would be hard to control in a research setting. For example, a researcher interested in how 
age moderates mimicry effects could not employ a child confederate for ethical and practical 
reasons.  
3.1.4 Robustness and statistical power. Finally, it is increasingly recognised that 
experimental methods in psychology may be imperfect, with weak statistical power (Chase & 
Chase, 1976; Cohen, 1962; Tressoldi, 2012) and possible experimenter effects (Doyen, Klein, 
Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Klein et al., 2012). This is particularly a challenge when 
studying subtle social effects like mimicry and when using confederates. Our brief review of 
the mimicry-liking link suggest an approximate average effect size of η2 = .01 and an average 
sample size of 62 participants. Most studies have used a between-subjects design, possibly to 
reduce participant awareness of the experimental conditions, although this is not necessarily 
an effective precaution (Lambdin & Shaffer, 2009). A power-analysis (G*Power) suggests 
that detecting an effect of η2 = .1 with a between-groups design would require 120 participants 
per group. Detecting a similar effect size with a within-subjects design would require only 22 
participants (c.f. Cohen, 1992). As new factors are introduced, increasingly large participant 
samples must be recruited for between-subjects experiments to achieve sufficient 
experimental power. Between-subjects paradigms are also hard to adapt to fMRI to allow 
neuroimaging. Therefore, it may not be feasible to study how mimicry effects vary across 
different contexts and individuals using traditional between-subjects paradigms. 
3.2 Future Directions: Overcoming Challenges 
3.2.1 Mimicry priming. One way to avoid the difficulties with instructed mimicry is 
to record mimicry spontaneously occurring during interactions between two participants in a 
laboratory, neither of whom knows that mimicry is under investigation.  In this context, video 
scoring of mimicry behaviours and post-session questionnaires are available to monitor the 
interaction, but critically the mimicry itself is generated spontaneously rather than being 
instructed. This method has been used to good effect in some studies (Heerey & Crossley, 
2013; Heerey & Kring, 2007). However, there is little experimental control in these contexts. 
Priming of mimicry behaviour provides one way to improve experimental control. Priming 
involves the unconscious or unintentional facilitation of a particular behaviour, such as 
mimicry, through exposure to a particular type of stimulus or event (Molden, 2014).  For 
example, a scrambled sentence task using prosocial concepts can lead to increases in mimicry 
behaviour (van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, de Bouter, & van Knippenberg, 2003) and 
automatic imitation of finger tapping movements (J. Cook & Bird, 2011; Leighton, Bird, 
Orsini, & Heyes, 2010), compared to sentences containing disaffiliative or antisocial words.  
Note that it matters in such paradigms whether priming sentences describe first-person or 
third-person events (Wang & Hamilton, 2013). This is consistent with other research that has 
reported increased levels of mimicry following unsuccessful affiliation (Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003) or third party ostracism (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Over & Carpenter, 2009). 
Overall, there is convergent evidence to show that mimicry is reliably increased by first-
person prosocial stimuli or third-person antisocial stimuli, and the stimuli may be verbal or 
non-verbal.  If one or both participants were primed to show more mimicry before a social 
interaction, both their behaviour during the interaction and their impressions afterwards could 
be measured. Therefore, priming could be a reliable and flexible way of manipulating 
mimicry within participants.  
The major advantage of priming mimicry is that researchers could study the effects of 
mimicry as it spontaneously occurs. This is important, because the majority of empirical 
evidence we have about how people respond to mimicry comes from studies where mimicry 
was artificially instructed. We do not know to what extent behaviour in these studies diverges 
from true mimicry interactions where both the mimicker and mimickee are unconscious of 
mimicry, and therefore it is unclear how much error there is in any of the theoretical models 
we have outlined. Existing results could be validate or challenged using mimicry priming 
paradigms. Furthermore, priming would allow researchers to examine cognitive processes in 
both the mimicker and mimickee during a mimicry interaction, which could lead to the 
development of more sophisticated cognitive models that connect processes of producing 
mimicry and responding to mimicry.   
3.2.2 Virtual mimicry. An alternative method for overcoming the challenges we 
outlined is to manipulate mimicry in virtual reality. Virtual reality is a popular tool for social 
research because people usually react to virtual characters similarly to how they would with 
real people (Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall, & Loomis, 2001; Donath, 2007; Garau, Slater, 
Pertaub, & Razzaque, 2005; Reeves & Nass, 1996). Exploiting this, Bailenson & Yee (2005) 
developed a method for virtual mimicry. In this method, the participant wears a sensitive 
motion tracking device which detects the rotation of their body multiple times every second 
(e.g. 120 Hz), providing an accurate movement trajectory. So far, virtual mimicry studies 
have only tracked head movements, but tracking could be extended to the whole body. 
Bailenson & Yee (2005) then programmed a virtual character to deliver a speech and mirror 
the participant like a reflection, with a delay of four seconds between the participant’s 
movement and the character’s movement. They suggest that delay was optimal for 
maximising mimicry responses while minimising detection (Bailenson et al., 2004). To 
achieve a control condition where the character does not mimic the participant, movement 
recorded from a previous participant who was being mimicked was applied to the character 
instead.  
This method has the advantage of high control over the mimicry manipulation. Virtual 
characters are ‘reverse engineered’ (Fox, Arena, & Bailenson, 2009) to only perform the 
necessary behaviours, such as speaking, blinking and mimicking or not mimicking 
(Bailenson & Yee, 2005). The mimicry and control conditions are also well-matched, 
because the character is always animated with real movements made by a person being 
mimicked. Furthermore, the mimicry interaction can be perfectly replicated using the same 
computer code (Verberne et al., 2013), while characteristics of the character and the virtual 
environment can be endlessly tailored. For example, the researcher who wanted to investigate 
age could program a child character to mimic participants (Banakou, Groten, & Slater, 2013). 
Compared to laboratory settings, it is also more feasible to seamlessly switch between virtual 
characters and environments, which could avoid transparency in within-participants 
experiments. Finally, it may be more feasible to measure real-time responses to mimicry 
using virtual reality. Motion tracking devices can provide data about how people physically 
respond while they interact (e.g. Bailenson et al., 2008). Alternatively, researchers can play 
back recorded segments of the participant’s virtual experience when they make ratings 
afterwards (C. McCall, personal communication, 4th September 2014), or even allow them to 
rate their experiences in real time using a virtual interface.  
As well as overcoming many of the challenges associated with traditional paradigms, 
virtual mimicry could be used to test competing cognitive models about how people respond 
to mimicry. For example, to distinguish between the Contingency and Similarity models 
described earlier, one could program virtual characters that behave towards a participant with 
varying degrees of contingency and similarity. The physical similarity of the virtual mimicker 
to the participant could also be varied, to the extent of creating an avatar that almost perfectly 
resembles the participant (e.g. Osimo, Pizarro, Spanlang, & Slater, 2015), which could 
provide relevant data for evaluating the Self-Other Overlap model in relation to other models. 
Extending beyond the models described in this paper, many other potentially relevant 
parameters can be altered in virtual mimicry, such as the precise time delay between 
participant and virtual character actions. 
There are some disadvantages to virtual mimicry. First, virtual mimicry tends to be an 
all-or-none behaviour, which cannot easily be ramped up or down within a single interaction 
in the same way as natural human mimicry. Second, the virtual characters must also be 
programmed with other aspects of natural social interaction (e.g. joint gaze) to make them 
socially realistic. This can be technically difficult to implement. However, the precise control 
of every individual social behaviour in virtual reality can be described as an advantage 
because it allows us to test the impact of each behaviour separately. Studies of virtual 
mimicry have reported similar effects to mimicry from human confederates even with 
minimal other behaviours (e.g. Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Verberne et al., 2013; Vrijsen, Lange, 
Dotsch, et al., 2010), suggesting this can be an effective alternative approach.  
3.2.3 Neuroimaging studies of mimicry. A major challenge for any neuroimaging 
study of mimicry is generating appropriate behaviour under controlled conditions. The 
participant must generate behaviour which can be mimicked, but they must also not be aware 
that the mimicry is occurring. However, most neuroimaging modalities require the participant 
to keep still, which restricts the range of possible movements they can perform. To overcome 
this challenge, future neuroimaging studies could take two different approaches. 
First, virtual mimicry could be combined with fMRI. Crucially, virtual mimicry 
paradigms involve very precise control of mimicry timing and may therefore provide suitable 
manipulations for fMRI. In order to translate virtual mimicry into the scanner setting, it 
would be necessary to use a non-magnetic motion tracking system to record the participant’s 
movements and drive the virtual character’s behaviour. Due to the sensitivity of fMRI to 
motion artifacts, it would also be necessary to restrict the range of head and body movement 
made by the participant within the scanner. Freedom of movement could be increased by 
using an optical tracking system to control for motion artifacts (Zaitsev, Dold, Sakas, Hennig, 
& Speck, 2006), or alternatively hand movements could be the target mimicry (cf. Guionnet 
et al., 2012). However, the constriction of the fMRI environment might also make it difficult 
to achieve an ecologically valid social interaction when using virtual characters. 
A second option would be to combine mimicry priming or virtual mimicry with 
fNIRS (functional near-infrared spectroscopy). fNIRS is a non-invasive imaging technique 
which measures haemodynamic responses in the brain, detected using infrared light emitted 
by optodes fitted against the scalp. The major advantages of fNIRS over fMRI in the context 
of mimicry are that fNIRS is portable and much less sensitive to motion artifacts, meaning 
participants are able to move freely in a face-to-face interaction. A recent experiment 
demonstrated this possibility by using fNIRS while participants played the popular dance 
video game, Dance Dance Revolution (Noah et al., 2015). Participants also completed a 
version of the game adapted for fMRI, and the researchers confirmed there were equivalent 
activation patterns between the two methods, consistent with other cross-validations (Irani, 
Platek, Bunce, Ruocco, & Chute, 2007). However, participants were asked not to touch their 
face or head while wearing the fNIRS optodes in order to avoid face-touching artifacts; this is 
a disadvantage for studies of mimicry, as face-touching is a commonly mimicked action 
(Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; van Baaren et al., 2003). Limited depth 
of penetration in fNIRS also presents a major challenge for testing the possible role of the 
neural reward system in neurocognitive models of mimicry, because activity in regions such 
as the caudate and insula would not be detectable using fNIRS.  
Moving forward, an optimal strategy for neuroimaging studies in this area could be to 
carry out complementary experiments using fMRI and fNIRS (Noah et al., 2015). Whereas 
fMRI could provide high spatial resolution about brain regions activated by being mimicked, 
fNIRS provides greater ecological validity to examine mimicry in real-world contexts. Future 
neuroimaging studies will be highly valuable for helping to distinguish between possible 
neurocognitive models for responding to mimicry, such as those we have outlined above. Due 
to the scarcity of neural data from participants being mimicked, we currently have to draw 
from neuroimaging studies which tapped into related processes such as deliberate imitation 
and behavioural synchrony. In order to generate an accurate model of the brain regions and 
cognitive processes involved in being mimicked, future research will need to exploit 
technological advances in virtual reality, motion tracking and neuroimaging in order to obtain 
data from participants during true mimicry interactions.  
3.3 Summary 
Progress in understanding how people respond to mimicry will require wider adoption 
of new methods to overcome the challenges we have highlighted. Mimicry priming and 
virtual reality are two potential tools for future mimicry research, which have the respective 
advantages of high ecological validity and good experimental control. There are already some 
proof-of-principle studies demonstrating the validity of these approaches. However, to 
address important questions about the mechanisms that produce responses to mimicry, we 
will need to carry out more rigorous studies that combine highly realistic and controlled 
mimicry paradigms with neuroimaging techniques.  
 
 
4. Unanswered Questions and Broader Scope 
Finally, we turn to several major questions about mimicry which remain unanswered. 
We then broaden our scope to briefly consider how mimicry may be studied within a wider 
context of coordinated behaviour, and in development.   
4.1 What is the timing of mimicry?  
People’s responses to mimicry have been measured at varying timescales. Temporal 
aspects of mimicry have received little attention (cf. Chartrand & Lakin, 2013), but could be 
relevant to explaining how responses to mimicry emerge. Firstly, the effects of mimicry are 
likely to depend on the time delay involved. In the studies we have reviewed, confederates 
were typically trained to mimic at delays between 2 and 5 seconds (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
van Baaren, Decety, et al., 2009). However, the actual timing of natural or confederate 
mimicry is unknown. One study manipulated the time delay in virtual mimicry (1, 2, 4 or 8 
seconds; Bailenson et al., 2004) and found that people were less able to detect mimicry at 
longer time delays. This suggests the timing of mimicry matters and people may have 
stronger responses to being mimicked as the time delay approaches synchrony. Evidence for 
stronger responses would favour the Contingency and Similarity models over the Self-Other 
Overlap model. Therefore, further investigation of the timing of mimicry will be important 
for distinguishing between different possible models of mimicry effects. 
Secondly, the duration of the mimicry interaction may also be important. The effect of 
mimicry on liking has been tested following interactions ranging from less than a minute to 
over 30 minutes in duration (Table 2). There is some evidence that different mimicry effects 
emerge after different durations. For instance, Verberne et al. (2013) found different results 
from an identical virtual mimicry algorithm experienced for different lengths of time. 
Fischer-Lokou et al. (2014) found that when a trained confederate mimicked participants for 
five minutes within a fifteen-minute negotiation task, this did not affect the outcomes of the 
negotiation; however, when mimicry was present throughout the negotiation task, this led to 
significantly more agreements and positive ratings of the negotiation. Their studies suggest 
that verbal mimicry may take some time to have an effect. On the other hand, some studies 
we reviewed have showed that unconscious behavioural mimicry significantly increases 
liking towards the mimicker at shorter timescales (e.g. Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Kouzakova, 
Karremans, et al., 2010; Stel et al., 2011). Therefore, future research will be needed to test 
whether people’s responses to mimicry change over the course of an interaction and why 
some mimicry responses seem to emerge more quickly than others.  
4.2 What causes conscious mimicry detection and what impact does this have?  
It is unclear what causes mimicry to become consciously detected and why people 
respond differently when they realise they are being mimicked. Bailenson et al.’s (2004)study 
suggests that decreasing the time delay in mimicry increases the likelihood that people will 
consciously detect mimicry, but their study involved a perfect replication of the participants’ 
movements by a virtual character, which means there may also have been a much higher 
degree of movement similarity compared to natural mimicry. Since no other studies have 
analysed data from participants who detected mimicry (Catmur & Heyes, 2013), we have 
very little information as to what might cause unconscious recognition of mimicry to feed 
into conscious awareness. Due to this lack of data, it is also unclear why the positive effects 
of mimicry were broke down when people became conscious of the mimicry manipulation 
(Bailenson et al., 2008). As Catmur and Heyes (2013) point out, participants in Bailenson et 
al.’s (2008) virtual mimicry study were not naïve to the possibility they would be mimicked, 
and this might have contributed to their negative response. They suggest that conscious 
awareness of the contingent nature of mimicry may lead to negative responses. However, this 
speculation remains to be tested.  
4.3 Does mimicry have different effects at implicit and explicit levels?  
Mimicry might have different effects on implicit behaviour compared to explicit 
subjective feelings. This distinction was recently suggested by Hasler et al. (2014), who 
found that mimicry from a social outgroup member led to an increase in implicit empathy 
towards the outgroup in during conversation, but not in explicit ratings of warmth towards the 
outgroup. If mimicry effects operate differently on implicit behaviour compared to explicit 
feelings, this could also explain why the effects of mimicry on behavioural tasks measuring 
trust (Verberne et al., 2013) and persuasion (van Swol, 2003) appear to be more fragile or 
task-dependent (Hasler et al., 2014) than the effects of mimicry on trust and persuasion 
ratings. For example, the investment game (which taps into implicit trust behaviour) is 
sensitive to stable individual differences in trusting others (Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; 
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, Walkowitz, & 
Wichardt, 2014), whereas ratings of trust or liking towards a specific person may be more 
sensitive to modulation by social characteristics such as similarity or reputation. Therefore, in 
future research about how people respond to mimicry, we should consider the distinction 
between implicit and explicit responses. 
4.4 What is the relationship between different kinds of mimicry?  
Many different kinds of behaviour may be mimicked beyond body movements and 
posture (Duffy & Chartrand, 2015). In particular, a large body of research shows that people 
a diverse range of behaviours like facial expressions (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 
1986, 1987; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Hsee, Hatfield, Carlson, & Chemtob, 
1990), sniffing (Arzi, Shedlesky, Secundo, & Sobel, 2014) and speech (Giles & Powesland, 
1975; Neumann & Strack, 2000), as well as overt choices (Harakeh, Engels, Van Baaren, & 
Scholte, 2007; Hermans et al., 2012; Quigley & Collins, 1999; Tanner et al., 2008; Webb, 
Eves, & Smith, 2011). It is not clear whether all of these different forms of mimicry reflect 
similar mechanisms or how they relate to one another. Our understanding of the causes and 
consequences of mimicry would benefit from an investigation of which neural and cognitive 
processes are common and distinct among different types of mimicry.  
It also remains unclear how unconscious behavioural mimicry is related to 
behavioural synchrony. This relationship was highlighted by Chartrand and Lakin (2013). 
Traditionally mimicry and synchrony have been discussed in separate literatures, although 
each reports similar effects on liking and prosocial behaviour (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). 
There also appear to be shared brain systems in responding to mimicry versus synchronised 
movement (Kokal et al., 2011; van Baaren et al., 2004; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). By 
definition, mimicry involves movements which match in form, whereas synchrony involves 
movements which match in time. However it is unclear whether this conceptual difference 
corresponds to differences in how people react to being mimicked compared to acting in 
synchrony.  
4.5 Broader Scope 
Throughout this review we have focused on responses to behavioural mimicry as if 
they were isolated phenomena, reflecting much of the empirical work in this field. Here, we 
wish to briefly draw attention to some broader perspectives that may yield future directions 
for mimicry research.  
Firstly, mimicry is just one subcategory of interpersonal coordination within a dyad 
(Table 1). Other types of coordinated behaviour, including imitation, entrainment and 
synchrony, currently occupy separate research literatures. Discussions which integrate 
different areas of coordination literature tend to focus on similarities and differences between, 
for example, mimicry and synchrony (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Hove & Risen, 2009; 
Piercarlo Valdesolo et al., 2010). This approach helps us to organise different sub-categories 
of coordinated behaviour. However, it is not yet known if these different sub-categories of 
coordinated behaviour form a single continuum dependent on the same basic neural 
mechanisms in all cases, or if there are clear distinctions in the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms for different interpersonal behaviours. For example, do imitation and 
complementary action draw on exactly the same systems? Are different mechanisms involved 
in synchrony compared to delayed imitation? Answering these questions will be important in 
understanding the place of mimicry in a broader social interaction context. 
Secondly, mimicry can be a reciprocal process in which interaction partners switch 
between mimicker and mimickee roles. For practical purposes, we typically design 
experiments in which the participant is either mimicker or mimickee. This approach has 
generated a lot of research into what causes the mimicker to mimic, and (to a lesser extent) 
the downstream consequences of mimicry for the mimickee. However, other angles are less 
explored; for example, very few studies have investigated consequences of mimicry for the 
mimickee. Notable exceptions include studies by Inzlicht and colleagues, who have shown 
that mimicking outgroup members can reduce the mimicker’s prejudice (Inzlicht, Gutsell, & 
Legault, 2012), and Stel and colleagues, who examined effects on prosocial behaviour (Stel, 
van Baaren, & Vonk, 2008), justice beliefs (Stel, Bos, & Bal, 2012; Stel, van den Bos, Sim, 
& Rispens, 2013) and lie detection (Stel et al., 2009). Moving forward, it may be beneficial to 
move away from the distinction between mimickers and mimickees and instead distinguish 
between mimicry production and mimicry perception within the same individual. This 
perspective is already used in research on deliberate imitation: the production and perception 
of imitation can be seen to co-develop in children (e.g. Eckerman & Stein, 1990; Nadel-
Brulfert & Baudonniere, 1982; Nadel, 2014), and have been studied together in the same 
individual during neuroimaging studies (Brass et al., 2009; J. Decety et al., 2002; Guionnet et 
al., 2012).  If we were to apply a similar perspective to mimicry research, this might give us a 
clearer insight into common and distinct cognitive mechanisms involved in mimicking and 
responding to mimicry. One way to implement this approach could be through priming 
participants in a dyad to unconsciously mimic one another in turns.  
Finally, mimicry and other aspects of interpersonal coordination continue to develop 
from infancy to adulthood. Traditionally, mimicry has been investigated separately in infants 
and adults (although much of the infant research looks at adult-infant dyads), and there has 
been little exploration of how mimicry develops during childhood and adolescence. Our 
understanding of mimicry may benefit from a more joined-up view of mimicry development, 
especially with regards to the relationship between mimicry production and mimicry 
perception. In infant research, the ‘like-me’ theory suggests that mimicry perception develops 
on an innate capacity to mimic others (Meltzoff, 2007a, 2007b), whereas the competing ‘me-
like-you’ theory relies on mimicry perception to explain how that infants derive an 
understanding of themselves from others (Prinz, 2012). We may make progress in debates 
such as this one with a research agenda that bridges infant and adult mimicry. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Current research focusing on the mimickee is beginning to uncover complexities in 
people’s neural and cognitive responses to being mimicked. In behavioural research, a wide 
variety of positive responses to mimicry have been reported. However, links from mimicry to 
liking, trust and other positive outcomes appear to be fragile. Recent studies have revealed 
that positive responses to mimicry can break down in certain individuals and social situations 
where mimicry may be unexpected. Thus, a complex range of factors may determine how a 
given individual responds to mimicry in a given context. 
In addition to this range of factors, neuroscientific research shows that several brain 
systems are activated in response to mimicry, including regions associated with mirror 
properties, self-other processing and reward. However, the volume of data is very small, and 
it is unclear how these neural systems relate to the range of effects found in behavioural 
studies. We have outlined three potential models linking neural and cognitive responses to 
mimicry, which suggest that positive downstream consequences of mimicry may depend 
upon self-other overlap, detection of contingency or low prediction error. Each of these 
models receives partial support from behavioural data. A key area for future research will be 
to develop models which successfully explain neural and behavioural data. With the advance 
of imaging technologies such as NIRS, it may become more feasible to study neural 
responses in live social interactions.  
In order to reach a detailed neurocognitive understanding of how people respond to 
mimicry, researchers will also need to overcome limitations with traditional research designs. 
Alternative approaches to using confederate mimickers may open up new opportunities to 
achieve highly realistic and controlled experiments. We have outlined the advantages of 
unconsciously priming participants or programming virtual characters to mimic. In addition, 
future studies must have enough power for detecting subtle mimicry effects. If we focus on 
selecting appropriate methodologies, we may be able to address open questions which have 
so far been difficult to study, and embed theories of mimicry within a broader understanding 
of behavioural coordination. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Brain regions associated with being mimicked. Unconscious recognition of a 
perception-action match during mimicry may be associated with MNS activity. Being 
mimicked increases self-other processing, which may be linked to activity in TPJ and right 
inferior parietal cortex. Being mimicked is also associated with increased functional 
connectivity between vmPFC and striatum/insula. Increased activity in striatum and insula 
may reflect reward and positive responses to being mimicked. The Self-Other Overlap, 
Contingency and Similarity models predict different cognitive pathways connecting these 
brain regions. 
 
  
Table 1. Definitions. 
General terms 
 
Interpersonal coordination  
The degree to which the behaviours in an interaction are nonrandom, patterned, or 
synchronised in both timing and form (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991). 
 Synchrony in timing Delay in timing 
 Entrainment 
The behaviour of two 
moving actors A1 and A2 becomes 
coupled because they mutually 
affect each other's behaviour 
(Knoblich & Sebanz, 2008). 
Contingency 
The extent to which 
activation of one representation 
predicts activation of another 
(Cook et al., 2010). 
Same 
form 
Perfect synchrony 
The matching of behaviour 
in both form and time (Miles et al., 
2010), e.g. marching in parade. 
Imitation 
Copying the form of an 
action (Whiten et al., 2009). 
Imitation is volitional (Kinsbourne 
& Helt, 2011) and goal-directed 
(Bekkering et al., 2000). 
 
Mimicry 
The automatic imitation of 
gestures, postures, mannerisms, 
and other motor movements 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
Mimicry is not goal-directed 
(Hamilton, 2008). 
Differe
nt form 
General synchrony 
The matching of different 
behaviours at the same time, e.g. 
playing of an orchestra. 
Complementary actions 
and other non-matching contingent 
behaviours, e.g. taking an object 
from someone’s hand. 
Table 2. Studies measuring the effect of mimicry on liking. 
Refe
rence 
Exp
erimental 
design 
Social 
interaction task 
Mimicr
y condition 
Control 
condition 
Mi
micry 
duration  
Measure 
of liking 
Part
icipants (N) 
Rep
orted effect 
size 
Sig
nificance (p) 
Baile
nson & Yee 
(2005) 
Betw
een-
participants 
Persuasi
ve speech 
Virtual 
character mirrored 
participant head 
movement 
Virtual 
character displayed 
previous participant 
head movement 
195 
seconds 
Agent 
impression: 13 
itemsa, including 9-
point scale  
Not at all 
likeable – Very 
likeable 
69 Not 
reported 
<.00
1 
Drur
y & van Swol 
(2005) 
Betw
een-
participants 
Debate Confede
rate mirrored 
participant body 
posture and 
movement 
Confederate 
moved naturally while 
avoiding movement 
related to the 
participant’s 
movement 
10 
minutes 
7-point 
scale  
Not 
likeable -Likeable 
78 η2= 
0.01 
.90 
Kouz
akova, 
Karremans et 
al. (2010) 
Betw
een-
participants 
Mundan
e tasks, e.g. 
describing photos 
and naming 
Confede
rate mirrored 
participant body 
posture and 
Confederate 
moved naturally while 
avoiding movement 
synchronous with the 
5 
minutes 
7-point 
scale (Likeability) 
69 η2 = 
.11 
.03 
depicted animals movement participant’s 
movement 
Kouz
akova 
Karremans et 
al. (2010) 
Betw
een-
participants 
Mundan
e tasks 
Confede
rate mirrored 
participant body 
posture and 
movement 
Confederate 
moved naturally while 
avoiding movement 
synchronous with the 
participant’s 
movement 
5 
minutes 
7-point 
scale (Likeability) 
40 η2 = 
.12 
.03 
Kouz
akova, van 
Baaren et al. 
(2010) 
Betw
een-
participants 
Mundan
e tasks 
Confede
rate mirrored 
participant body 
posture and 
movement 
Confederate 
moved naturally while 
avoiding movement 
synchronous with the 
participant’s 
movement 
10 
minutes 
7-point 
scale  
Not at all 
– Very much 
(Likeable) 
72 η2 = 
.12 
.004 
Stel 
et al. (2011) 
Betw
een-
participants 
Descript
ion of film 
fragment 
Confede
rate mimicked 
participant body 
posture and 
movement 
Confederate 
avoided mimicry 
while keeping other 
behaviour constant 
3 
minutes 
7-point 
scale  
Did you 
like your interaction 
partner? Did you 
get along with your 
interaction partner? 
88 η2 = 
0.10 
.01 
 Stel 
et al. (2011) 
Betw
een-
participants 
Giving 
transport 
directions 
Confede
rate mimicked 
participant body 
posture and 
movement and 
vocal and facial 
expressions 
Confederate 
avoided mimicry 
while keeping other 
behaviour constant 
43 
seconds 
(average) 
7-point 
scale  
Did you 
like your interaction 
partner? Did you 
get along with your 
interaction partner? 
Pros
elf: 
22 
 
Pros
ocial: 
27 
Pros
elf: 
Not 
reported  
 
Pros
ocial: 
η2 = 
0.08  
 
Pros
elf: 
n.s.  
 
Pros
ocial: 
.05  
Verb
erne et al. 
(2013) 
Betw
een-
participants 
Task 
instructions 
Virtual 
character mirrored 
participant head 
movement 
Virtual 
character displayed 
previous participant 
head movement 
Tria
l 1:  
102 
seconds 
 
Tria
l 2: 
Not 
reported 
Liking: 13 
itemsa, including 7-
point scale  
Totally 
disagree – Totally 
agree (Likeable ) 
40 
 
Tria
l 1: 
Not 
reported  
 
Tria
l 2: 
ηp² 
= .13  
 
Tria
l 1: 
> 
.131  
 
Tria
l 2: 
.027 
Mad
dux et al. 
(2008) 
Betw
een-
participants 
Negotiat
ion 
Other 
participant 
instructed to 
mimic participant 
moveme
nts  
Other 
participant not 
instructed to mimic 
45 
minutes 
5-point 
scale  
How 
much did you like 
negotiating with the 
other person? 
Not at all 
– very much  
62 Not 
reported 
> 
.23 
van 
Swol (2003) 
With
in-participants 
Debate Confede
rate mirrored 
participant body 
posture and 
movement from 
waist up 
Confederate 
moved naturally while 
avoiding movement 
related to the 
participant’s 
movement 
10- 
12 minutes 
7-point 
scale  
Not 
likeable -Likeable 
54 Coh
en’s d = .62 
.64 
 
aOriginal items can be found in Guadagno & Cialdini (2002) 
  
Table 3. Neuroimaging results for regions that respond to being mimicked. 
Re
ference 
I
maging 
method 
Social 
interaction task 
Conditions Par
ticipants 
(N) 
Contrast Regions activated Coo
rdinates (x, 
y, z) 
De
cety et al. 
(2002) 
P
ET  
Participants 
used their hands to 
move three small 
objects into a 
configuration. They 
were shown their own 
movements or similar 
actions by an 
experimenter over 
video link.  
• Participant imitates 
experimenter,  
• Experimenter 
imitates participant, 
• Participant watches 
own actions, 
• Participant watches 
experimenter’s 
actions 
 
18 Experimenter 
imitates participant  
> Participant 
imitates experimenter 
R medial frontal 
gyrus  
R supramarginal 
gyrus  
R middle frontal 
gyrus  
R inferior temporal 
gyrus  
L pre-SMA  
L posterior 
cingulate  
L medial frontal 
20, 
24, 40 
56, -
46, 28 
28, 
40, 18 
66, -
52, -12 
24, 
12, 66 
-12, 
-70, 44 
gyrus  
L anterior cingulate  
L orbital gyrus  
 
-12, 
20, 38 
24, 
28, 20 
-18, 
-52, 20 
Br
ass et al. 
(2009) 
f
MRI  
Participants 
completed an 
imitation-inhibition 
task in which they had 
to execute index or 
middle finger 
movements and 
observed video stimuli 
of congruent or 
incongruent 
• Simultaneously 
imitate 
• Simultaneously 
counter-imitate 
• Be imitated after a 
delay 
• Be counter-imitated 
after a delay 
 
20 Be imitated 
after a delay  
> 
Simultaneously 
imitate 
TPJ  (ROI analysis 
only) 
52, -
54, 21 
movements. 
  
Ku
hn et al. 
(2010) 
f
MRI  
Participants 
watched pseudo-first-
person perspective 
videos of one person 
interacting with 
various interaction 
partners. The person’s 
hand and leg 
movements were 
mimicked or anti-
mimicked by their 
interaction partner. 
 
• Mimicry 
• Antimimicry 
 
15 Mimicry >  
Anti-mimicry 
mOFC/vmPFC 
(BA 10) 
–7, 
49, –7 
Ko f Participants • Synchrony 
• Asynchrony 
18 Synchrony > L post central -52, 
kal et al. 
(2011) 
MRI  completed a 
drumming task with 
two experimenters 
outside the scanner. 
One experimenter 
drummed in 
synchrony with them 
and the other 
drummed out of 
synchrony. Baseline 
was taken during 
random pauses 
between drumming 
trials. 
• Baseline 
 
Baseline gyrus 
R inferior frontal 
gyrus 
L medial temporal 
gyrus 
R cerebrellar 
vermis III 
R SMA 
R post central 
gyrus (BA 4p) 
STG 
L post central 
gyrus (BA 2) 
R IPL 
R superior medial 
gyrus 
-16, 40 
52, 
6, 14 
-54, 
-38, 8 
2, -
36, -16 
4, -2, 
52 
38, -
26, 52 
50, -
14, 4 
-42, 
32, 42 
44, -
L pallidum 
R pallidum 
R caudate 
R thalamus 
L thalamus 
L putamen 
 
46, 48 
54, -
34, 42 
-20, 
4, 2 
20, -
6, -4 
14, 
6, 8 
12, -
12, 4 
-12, 
-14, 4 
-18, 
4, 8 
 
Gu
ionnet et 
al. (2012) 
f
MRI  
Participants 
interacted with an 
experimenter outside 
the scanner by making 
hand gestures over 
video link. In one 
condition, gesture 
matching was freely 
co-regulated by the 
interactors. In another 
condition, the 
experimenter or 
participant was 
instructed to imitate. 
 
• Experimenter freely 
imitates participant 
• Participant freely 
imitates 
experimenter 
• Experimenter 
instructed to imitate 
participant 
• Participant 
instructed to imitate 
experimenter 
 
23 Be imitated  >  
Imitate 
(collapsed 
across free and 
instructed conditions) 
dACC (BA 32) 
dACC (BA 24) 
left anterior insula 
−2, 
22, 38 
6, 
24, 28 
−38, 
18, 0 
 
